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I Why Multinational Corporations Still Need 
| to Keep It Local: Environment, Operations, 
I and Ownership in the Hospitality Industry 
I Jie J. Zhang, Nitin R. Joglekar, and Rohit Verma 
; Introduction 
r 
i "' 
k While the goal of environmental sustainability offers positive global im-
• pact, its implementation must consider the inherent variations in the local 
\ environmental, social, and economic contexts. For instance, EnerNOC, a 
• U.S. firm engaged in demand-side management of energy consumption, 
employs a business model that reduces aggregate energy demand during 
peak loads, and passes the savings to clients who respond to its conserva-
tion calls by reducing their energy demand (Healy 2007). EnerNOC has 
I been successful in signing up key accounts including large corporations, 
: governmental agencies, hotels, hospitals, and universities, yet its growth 
I is limited by the ability of its sales force to engage individual building 
? and facility managers to implement the demand-response practice (Tut-
telman 2008). EnerNOC's experience shows that local variations in both 
the built environment and operational issues are central to the diffusion 
> of sustainability practices. A wide community of users and environmental 
; leaders recognize this connection, such as the USGBC (U.S. Green Build-
. ing Council) through its LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
f Design) rating system. Specifically, the LEED Existing Buildings: Opera-
? tions & Maintenance certification system (LEED EBOM) underlines how 
, operations can stand in the way of realizing the potential of sustainable 
design and construction. We recognize this critical lens of local opera-
tions, and use it to assess the effectiveness of design parameters, construc-
: tion standards, and operations in terms of consumption outcomes. 
In the built environment, operations managers of individual sites face 
two major challenges in implementing sustainability practices. The first 
challenge involves difficulties in tracking environmental performance, be-
cause sites often lack consistent ways of measuring resource consumption 
or monitoring energy consumption patterns (Schleich and Gruber 2008). 
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To this end, we develop operating measurements that reflect the contin-
gent nature of environmental sustainability at the site level. With these 
measurements in place, corporations and facility managers can monitor 
outcomes of sustainability practices, thus providing feedback necessary 
for further improvement. 
The second challenge lies in the conventional firm-centric view that 
overlooks the effect of diverging interests and performance-evaluation 
criteria of collaborating parties such as the building owner and the build-
ing operator. Delmas and Toffel (2008) show that within an organization, 
the difference in adopting environmental management practices relates 
to the receptivity of market and nonmarket pressures across functional 
departments such as corporate legal affairs and marketing departments. 
We argue that such varying receptivity is even more pronounced across 
firm boundaries. For example, in a hotel service chain, the central play-
ers, collaborating through franchise or management contracts or both, 
typically include the owner, who focuses on the development and man-
agement of the hotel real estate property, and the operator, who focuses 
on managing the daily hotel operations (i.e., guest services, facility man-
agement operations, and reservation systems). Consequently, the owner 
prefers practices that enhance the valuation of the physical assets, while 
the operator prefers practices that increase revenue—usually the base of 
royalty and management fees. In other words, due to their specialization 
and distinct reward structures, each service supply chain partner strives 
for a unique subset of business benefits (see chapter 11, this volume). 
Recognizing that supply chain partners do not share uniform interests 
in adopting sustainability practices, this chapter develops a theoretical 
framework to explicate the diverging interests along the chain and sug-
gests potential economic and policy measures to align them. ••;; 
We inform our arguments through an exploratory study of sustainabil-
ity measures in a typical built environment—hotels—which is an ideal lab 
to research sustainability for three reasons: n 
1. Data availability—the contractual arrangement between hotel owner 
and hotel operator requires cost reporting on resources consumed, result-
ing in data that are difficult to gather in other built environments such as 
residences or commercial office buildings. 
2. Industry commitment—major hotel chains identify sustainability 
as a strategic issue (Sherwyn 2010) for its potential to enhance brand 
image and reduce costs, creating strong momentum for sustainability 
innovations. 
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m 3, Demonstration effect—guests satisfied with their green lodging experi-
m
 e n c e might adopt some sustainability practices in their homes and work-
I places, yielding positive externalities. 
• 4 K To address the first challenge of measuring and comparing the per-
• formance of sustainability practices, we track 984 hotel sites across the 
• United States over an eight-year period and construct a standardized mea-
B sure of environmental sustainability based on resource efficiency. This 
• sustainability measure is driven by two factors: an operating cost factor 
I (OCF) and a consumer behavior cost factor (CBCF). We offer a compara-
1 tive analysis of these two factors based on variations in five basic hotel 
characteristics: ownership structure, operating structure, level of urban 
development, type of guests, and regional ambient temperature. We il-
lustrate that the values of these two factors vary systematically for each 
of the five characteristics. 
^ We use these differences to argue that it is possible—in fact desir-
.^ able—to incorporate local variations into environmental policy changes 
:
. aimed at improving sustainability in the built environment. For instance, 
effective environmental policy needs to address both the investment and 
% operational issues related to ownership structure: the asset owner may 
choose to invest in solar panels, but this investment .requires the operator 
to change related energy and facility management routines to fully realize 
the return. However, the return on investment often only accrues to one 
I party—utility savings for the owner in the case of solar panels. So there is 
I little incentive for the operator to participate. A reverse situation is also 
I possible. The asset owner's building architecture and energy equipment 
I constrains how far the operator's efforts can go toward establishing a 
I genuinely green brand reputation. Such situations are best described by 
!
»., the Prisoner's Dilemma with two players (Pruitt 1967). If both players 
commit to improvement, a win-win solution emerges; if both the players 
r defect (i.e., cheat in the hope of private gain through the partner's cornmit-
\. ment), a lose-lose scenario results. The threat to the cooperative efforts, 
hence the dilemma, arises from uncertainty of the partners' actions, in the 
presence of diverging performance goals. Unequal cooperation results in 
one side reaping rewards and the other becoming a "sucker." Clearly, no 
side wants to be the sucker. 
Having provided an overview of our study, this chapter is organized as 
follows. We first describe the industry setting for our empirical study, then 
define and calculate the resource-efficiency-based environmental sustain-
ability measures. Drawing from prior research on corporate motivations 
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to adopt sustainability, we then develop a framework to identify the fac-
tors that influence the multiple agents in the built environment who have 
diverging goals, constraints, and planning horizons. We flesh out specific 
tradeoffs within this multi-agent commitment framework, suggest con-
tracting and negotiation tools to bridge the incentive needs of various 
agents, and identify and close behavioral loopholes to accelerate the dif-
fusion of sustainability practices in the built environment. 
The U.S. Hospitality Industry 
The U.S. hospitality industry, with buildings situated in diverse settings 
across the country, and with ongoing sustainability efforts of varying 
types and degrees, lends itself to study supply chain coordination and in-
centive structures. Each hotel site is both a real estate investment for hotel 
owners and a service and brand building opportunity for hotel operators. 
Multiple ownership and operating structure configurations are possible 
in this industry: owner operated (they own or lease the property), major 
chain operated (branded management), or nonbranded hotel management 
company operated. Further, the hospitality industry measures its perfor-
mance in terms of return on assets (owner) and operating performance 
(operator), and both metrics are intimately linked with environmental 
sustainability practices. Table 5.1 illustrates the hospitality service supply 
chain for several common ownership structures and operating structures. 
We conducted our empirical study on 984 U.S. hotel sites' annual op-
erating statements from 2001 to 2008. These hotel sites are located across 
the United States, and represent all major U.S. hotel chains. We collected 
comparable information on all aspects of the hotel operations with an 
emphasis on operating expenses including consumption of fundamental 
resources such as electricity, water, and materials used as operating sup-
plies. PKF Hospitality Research, an industry trend research firm that has 
tracked thousands of hotels for nearly seventy years, provided the data. 
To resolve the first challenge listed previously of comparable data, we 
developed a measure to benchmark environmental sustainability in the 
hospitality industry based on the efficiency of hotels' use of fundamental 
resources to generate revenue (measured in revenue per available room— 
RevPAR). A wide range of resources are included: electricity; water and 
sewer; maintenance supplies; and laundry, linen, and supplies used in the 
rooms and food and beverage departments. This measure stemmed from 
analyzing the preceding panel dataset using exploratory factor analy-
sis—a statistical method that analyzes the varying patterns of resource 
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Table 5.1 
Hospitality service supply chain players: Ownership and operating structure 
choices in the hotel industry 
Types of owner-
ship and operating 
structure 
Responsibilities 
Manage 
property asset 
Manage 
operations 
Set standards 
and manage 
distribution 
Vertically integrated Owner 
Owner Franchisor/brand 
operated 
Professionally (non- ~ 
, , j . , Owner branded) managed 
Owner 
Brand 
Operator 
Owner 
Brand 
Brand 
consumption and identifies primary drivers of resource efficiency in the 
sample. This analysis yielded one measure of environmental sustainability 
consisting of OCF that assigns large weights to electricity, water, sewer, and 
maintenance expenses, and CBCF that assigns large weights to expenses 
from laundry, linen, and supplies used in the rooms and food and beverage 
departments. Although all expenses are subject to influences from both 
management and guests, the expenses measured by the operating cost fac-
tor are more affected by managerial decisions, and the expenses measured 
by the consumer behavior cost factor are largely driven by guests' choices. 
We generate normalized factor scores to indicate how efficient the hotels 
are in using the resources for every unit of revenue generated—hotels that 
score below zero are more resource efficient than the average, and hotels 
that score above zero are less resource efficient. In summary, this two-fac-
tor measure of environmental sustainability is a consistent industry-wide 
measure for benchmarking sustainability performance by considering 
both internal environmental management choices and the guests' resource 
consumption behavior. We compare the factor scores across five basic ho-
tel characteristics: ownership structure, operating structure, level of urban 
development, type of guests, and ambient temperature. 
Corporate Motivations to Adopt Sustainability 
A hotelier can expect several possible outcomes when she decides to build 
and operate sustainably. However, prior literature made conflicting pre-
dictions regarding the outcomes. Some of the earliest studies on corporate 
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sustainability issues argue that environmental concerns reduce profit 
maximization (Friedman 1970). Later, Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
argued that a firm's pollution is often associated with wasted resources 
(material, energy, etc.), and that more stringent environmental regulation 
can stimulate green innovations that may offset pollution prevention costs. 
These debates generated a series of arguments around why a firm ought 
to invest in environmental protection efforts, and the possible outcomes. 
For instance, some scholars cite incentives such as near-term profitability 
gains through toxic waste prevention (King and Lenox 2002) and finan-
cial markets' positive response to environmental awards announced and 
confirmed by third parties (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996). Drawing on 
institutional theory, early work in this arena predicts an inevitable shift in 
corporate environmentalism in which sustainability goals become a way 
of organizational life (Hoffman and Ehrenfeld 1998, 73). 
Various stakeholders (Freeman 1984) may also provide the motivation _. 
for building and operating green. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) conducted 
an extensive literature review and summarized the mechanisms through 
which firm characteristics may interact with various internal and exter-
nal factors to influence economic performance. For instance, a firm may I 
comply with government regulations, such as green procurement pro-
grams for EPA-designated products and services, and consequently enjoy 
increased revenue. m 
In spite of this extensive knowledge about a firm's motivation for sus-
tainability, we have just begun to understand the sustainability motiva-
tions of organizations that are hybrid (i.e., neither market nor hierar-
chy) or extend across firm boundaries (e.g., supply chains) but connected 
through contractual "bridges" (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2008). Prior 
research on the challenges of implementing strategic choices in individual 
operating units demonstrates the need for considering the multi-agent as-
pect of our study. For example, in the manufacturing context, researchers 
(Boyer and Lewis 2002; Boyer and McDermott 1999) found that a firm's 
personnel at different organizational levels can substantially disagree on 
strategic decisions. For instance, operations-level employees tended to 
rate investments in technology disproportionately higher than plant man-
agers. Further, Boyer and Lewis (ibid.) present case evidence of significant 
inconsistencies in competitive priorities (i.e., cost, delivery, flexibility, ana 
quality) across all levels of a firm's organizational chart. It is conceiv-
able that similar inconsistencies exist across a firm's operating units 
and 
supply chain, with each unit optimizing its environmental performance 
according to its own set of priorities, constraints, and reward structure. 
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Drawing on the research streams discussed previously, we examine the 
environmental sustainability outcomes at individual hotel sites. Each site 
is considered a standalone operating unit with a unique profile consist-
ing of internal resources (e.g., physical assets, brand equity, management 
expertise) and local conditions (e.g., location, ambient temperature). The 
supply chain partners at individual hotel sites interact differently with 
the external environment, such as conflicting responses to changes in the 
economy. For example, the performance goals of the hotel owner and the 
hotel operator can diverge, and tension often intensifies in tough eco-
nomic times, especially in the higher-tier luxury market segment. Hotel 
owners, facing debt service obligations on their multimillion-dollar in-
vestments, seek to cut costs. But high-end, branded hotel operators seek 
to maintain their revenues and uphold their premier brand image, which 
requires sustained operating cost levels, and leads to higher cost pres-
sure on the hotel owner. Indeed, during the recent economic downtown, 
several highly contentious hospitality industry cases surfaced where the 
owner ousted the operator over operating costs disputes (Segal 2009) or 
poor management performance (Berzon and Hudson 2011). Therefore, 
the diverging economic objectives and collaborative requirement of sus-
tainability practices at individual hotel sites necessitates a closer look at 
local variations. In particular, we make comparisons across five key local 
variations in the U.S. hotel industry and try to understand the causes and 
potential relief of the tensions that afflict the owners and operators in 
pursuit of environmental sustainability. 
0.7 -| • Operating cost factor (OCF) 
_ Consumer behavior cost factor (CBCF) 
0.5H 
0.3 
0.H 
0.1 
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(a) Ownership structure (b) Operating structure (c) Urban development 
Vertically Management Franchise/chain Nonbranded Rural/suburban Urban (1,000 
integrated outsourced managed management (under 1,000 persons/sqkm 
persons/sqkm) and more) 
Figure 5.1 
Environmental sustainability factor core comparisons in the hotel sector. 
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Ownership Structure: Vertically Integrated vs. Management Outsourced 
Typically, the land or the building, or both, of a hotel may be owned or 
leased by the hotel owner, who then outsources the hotel operation to a 
management company via a long-term contract. Under this ownership 
structure, the hotel's operator often identifies capital expenditures aimed 
at increasing energy efficiency, but the owner must approve and fund the 
efforts, resulting in a split-incentive problem (Schleich and Gruber 2008). 
Evidence from the commercial real estate market (Fisher and Rothkopf 
1989; Jaffe and Stavins 1994) suggests that neither the landlord (building 
owner), nor the tenant (the operating company) may have an incentive 
to invest in energy efficient equipment or services, although both parties 
may benefit from building value appreciation or the energy cost savings 
associated with increased energy efficiency. The landlord will not invest 
in energy efficiency if the investment costs cannot be passed on to the 
tenant. The tenant will not invest if the lease expires or terminates before 
recouping the energy efficiency investment costs. Sometimes, the hotel 
owner may choose to manage self-owned assets, resulting in a vertically 
integrated hotel where the owner is singly responsible for the costs and 
benefits of sustainability investment. Such integrated ownership structure 
requires the owner to have expertise in both real estate asset management 
and hotel service operations, but attenuates the split-incentive problem. 
Figure 5.1a shows the two factor scores OCF and CBCF of the en-
vironmental sustainability measure for two groups of hotels based on 
the ownership structure distinction (vertically integrated vs. management 
outsourced). The figure suggests that the hotels that are vertically inte-
grated score lower values in both OCF and CBCF, indicating a lower 
level of resource consumption per unit of revenue (i.e., higher resource ef-
ficiency). The resource efficiency lead of the vertically integrated hotels in 
figure 5.1a confirms the need to consider ownership structure and associ-
ated issues including split incentive when designing sustainability strategy 
and evaluating sustainability performance. 
Operating Structure: Franchisor/Chain Managed vs. Nonbranded Man-
agement Company 
In the United States, about 70 percent of hotels are affiliated with brand-
ed chains such as Marriott, Hilton, or Wyndham. The benefits of brand-
ing include instant access to an established customer base, extensive res-
ervation and marketing systems, and participation in dynamic processes 
such as strategy making (Bradach 1997). These benefits lead to synergy 
that enhances service uniformity and performance through innovation 
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and learning across the sites (Barlow 2000). A branded hotel may be op-
erated by the brand franchisor, a branded chain offering management 
services, or a nonbranded management company. On the one hand, in 
the franchisor/chain-managed hotels, by committing to the chain business 
model and investing in the mandated brand standards, the hotel owner 
faces potential hold-up problems that give the chain increased bargaining 
power (Unsal and Taylor 2009). On the other hand, the nonbranded hotel 
management company builds its core competences in hotel operations, 
and possesses no stake in the hotel's brand image. Because the choice of 
operating structure relates to the type of asset invested, the core com-
petencies of agents, and the reward system, it affects a wide range of 
strategic decisions, including sustainability. Figure 5.1b shows the factor 
scores—OCF and CBCF—for two groups of hotels: those managed by 
a franchisor or hotel chain company vs. those managed by nonbranded 
hotel management companies. The results show that franchisor/chain-
managed hotels are more resource efficient in both factors. This may in-
dicate that the franchisor and the chain operators have stronger incentive 
to increase resource efficiency due to their larger stake (e.g., in terms of 
brand equity) in the operation. Therefore, operating structure and its as-
sociated incentive issues are important considerations in the decisions to 
build and operate green. 
Location: Urban vs. Rural/Suburban 
The process of urbanization intertwines with people moving into cities 
to seek economic opportunities. So we draw the distinction between ur-
ban and rural/suburban areas by the population density—areas that have 
1,000 and more persons per square kilometer are considered urban, while 
areas that have less than 1,000 persons per square kilometer are consid-
ered rural/suburban. Higher population density accompanies increased 
per capita energy consumption and extensive modification of the natural 
environment (McDonnell and Pickett 1990). Consequently, hotels in vari-
ous locations may face varying resource and environmental pressures. For 
instance, high prices for gas and electricity and resource shortage (such 
as brownouts and water bans) are more likely to affect hotels located in. 
urban areas. Sustainable development strategies need to reflect the vary-
ing resource constraints across locations. Figure 5.1c shows a comparison 
of the two environmental sustainability factor scores for hotels located in 
urban areas and those located in rural or suburban areas. 
The graph shows that relative to their rural/suburban counterparts, the 
hotels in an urban environment consume fewer resources measured by 
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operating cost factor (e.g., maintenance and utilities) but consume more 
measured by the consumer behavior cost factor (e.g., supplies for rooms 
and food and beverage departments) per unit of revenue generated. Be-
cause the factor scores reflect cost-based resource efficiency, either higher 
revenue or lower total cost of consumption may contribute to these dif-
ferences. On the revenue side, urban hotels tend to charge higher prices 
for their services than their rural/suburban peers, resulting in a larger rev-
enue base for urban hotels. On the consumption cost side, opposite forces 
are at play: for OCF-driven decisions, higher resource scarcity in the ur-
ban areas may provide a stronger incentive for hotel managers to improve 
their resource efficiency, while perceived abundant resources may support 
wasteful processes and result in lower efficiency in the rural/suburban 
hotel sites. As for the CBCF, since the hotels have limited control over 
their guests' consumption behavior, the higher resource prices in urban 
areas dominate and result in lower consumer behavior-related resource 
efficiency in the urban areas. Therefore, the varying effects of location-
based constraints must be considered in the decision-making process for 
sustainability. 
Type of Guests Served: Transient vs. Group 
Some hotel guests travel for leisure (creating a "transient" income stream 
in hospitality industry terminology) and others for business purposes 
(creating a "group" income stream). Although almost identical in terms 
of the service delivery processes, these two types of income streams— 
transient and group—may involve different decision-making processes by 
the guests. For example, a tourist is likely to choose a hotel based on her 
budget, personal experience, and family consideration, while the same 
person on a business trip must consider her company travel policy in 
choosing a hotel. In other words, while transient income results from the 
individual guest's personal value system, group income is jointly deter-
mined by personal and institutional choices. One industry trend serves 
as a good indication of how these institutional and personal choices may 
interact. Increasingly, corporations are favoring hotels that promote ef-
forts toward environmental sustainability. A recent survey shows that 
65 percent of corporate travel executives responsible for over $10 mil-
lion in annual travel budgets are in various stages of implementing green 
business travel guidelines (HSPI 2011). It stands to reason that hotels 
that derive more income from group business and conference activities 
have stronger incentive to adopt sustainability initiatives. The types of 
guests served closely relate to the hotel property type, that is, the facilities 
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hotel 
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center 
Figure 5.2 
Property type and environmental sustainability factor scores in the hotel sector 
and amenities available to support certain guest activities. Our dataset 
contains seven types of hotel properties: conference center, resort hotel, 
full-service hotel, limited-service hotel, suite hotel, convention hotel, and 
extended-stay hotel. (The glossary details the definition for each hotel 
type.) Figure 5.2 depicts how the two factor scores of the environmental 
sustainability measure vary across different hotel types. 
The results show that resource consumption correlates positively with 
the level of service the hotels provide—resort and conference hotels con-
sume more resources along OCF and CBCF, while the limited-service 
and extended-stay hotels consume much less in both factors. At one end, 
resort and conference hotels provide extensive amenities such as pools/ 
saunas/health clubs, restaurants, shops, and ballrooms, and may be a des-
tination in their own right. At the other extreme are limited-service hotels 
that provide only essential lodging services and where guests tend to en-
gage in activities outside the hotel property boundary, and thus use fewer 
resources on the hotel premises. 
Regional Ambient Temperature: Hot vs. Cold 
The aggregate warming at the global level coupled with increasingly vola-
tile local weather conditions pose great challenges for hotels trying to pre-
dict future energy needs and balance guest comfort and energy require-
ments. Both the energy sources currently used to provide cooling and 
heating and potential or newly developed alternative energy sources are 
closely connected with the local natural resources and environment. For 
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Figure 5.3 
Environmental sustainability factor scores for the hotel sector (OCF and CBCF) 
by climate zone: owner managed vs. other managed 
instance, hotels in the U.S. Southwest face increasing pressure from water 
shortage problems due to the dry climate, but also are situated in an ideal 
climate to take advantage of solar energy innovations. Forming strategic 
relationships with appropriate energy and energy solution suppliers then ' 
becomes an important strategy for hotels. A sound environmental sus-
tainability strategy for a hotel site must therefore consider the markedly 
different long-term resource use patterns and potential scenarios. Figure 
5.3 depicts the operating cost factor scores and consumer behavior cost 
factor scores across different climate zones of the vertically integrated 
hotels and management outsourced hotels in our sample. 
Figure 5.3 identifies large variations in environmental sustainability as 
measured by OCF and CBCF across climate zones. Further, these two fac-
tors exhibit different variation patterns: specifically, vertically integrated 
hotels display a much smaller variability in OCF (dark solid bars in the 
graph) across climate zones. 
Paired-Case Comparisons 
We then conducted a series of f-tests to validate the intuitions gleaned 
from the graphs presented earlier (i.e., figures 5.1-5.3). The £-test assesses 
whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each oth-
er. For each of the five hotel characteristics, we divide the sample into two 
groups and compare the means of the OCF score and the CBCF score. For 
example, we first divide the sample into two groups based on the owner-
ship structure and use " O " to represent the group of hotels under owner 
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management and use "T" to represent the group of hotels where manage-
ment is outsourced. In addition, we compared subgroups by considering 
combinations of multiple characteristics, such as hotels in urban locations 
under owner management (UO) vs. urban hotels where management is 
outsourced (UT). Table 5.2 summarizes these paired-case t-test results. All 
the comparisons in table 5.2 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
To summarize, we provide evidence on the contingent nature of sustain-
ability practices by comparing the measured environmental sustainability 
of the hotels in our sample along local site variations including ownership 
structure (vertically integrated vs. management outsourced), operating 
structure (franchisor/chain managed vs. non-branded management), type 
of guests (transient vs. group), location (urban vs. rural/suburban), and 
ambient temperature {hot vs. cold). The graphs (figures 5.1-5.3) illustrate 
Table 5.2 
The £-test summary of environmental sustainability factor score comparisons 
across basic hotel characteristics1 
Owner-managed (O) vs. Outsourced (T) 
Franchisor/chain (F) vs. Nonbranded (M) 
Franchisor/chain O vs. T 
Nonbranded O vs. T 
Rural/suburban (R) vs. Urban (U) 
Rural/suburban O vs. T 
Urban O vs. T 
Ambient temperature Hot (H) vs. Cold (C) 
Hot O vs. T 
Cold O vs. T 
Full Service (S) vs. Limited (L) 
Full Service O vs. T 
Limited Service O vs. T 
OCF 
0>T2 
F>M 
FO>FT 
MO<MT 
R<U 
RO>RT 
UO>UT 
H<C 
HO>HT 
CO<CT 
S<L 
SO<ST 
LO>LT 
CBCF 
0>T 
F>M 
FO>FT 
MO<MT 
R>U 
RO>RT 
UO=UT 
H>C 
HO>HT 
CO<CT 
S<L 
SO<ST 
LO>LT 
1. The letters in the parentheses are shorthand for the hotel site characteristics. 
For example, FO represents a hotel that is owned and managed by a franchi-
sor/chain; while FT indicates a hotel for which the owner hires a franchisor/ 
chain as the operator. 
2. The ">" sign indicates better environmental sustainability as measured by 
the factor scores. 
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the distinct patterns in the measured environmental sustainability. The 
£-test comparisons statistically validate the intuitions from the graphs. 
(Readers may refer to Zhang, Joglekar, and Verma (2012) for statisti-
cal analyses that quantify the individual effects in the presence of other 
sources of variability such as scale of operations, market segment, and the 
overall economic cycle.) These analyses show that a multilevel theoretical 
approach is necessary to illuminate the various modes of inter-firm col-
laborations and intra-firm coordination, especially for organizations with 
complex distributed operations carrying distinct local characteristics. 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
A simple conclusion is that we observe considerable heterogeneity in the 
operating cost and consumer behavior cost components of environmental 
sustainability regarding local variations. Thus, a uniform policy aimed 
at coordinating multi-agent commitment may not be the most effective 
way to improve resource efficiency. That is, even if we draw upon the 
firm-centric view of the stakeholder-driven strategy formation process, 
we cannot attempt a unified implementation of strategies. The variation 
in sustainability performance associated with differences in asset owner-
ship, operating structure, location, and so on, requires a contingent ap-
proach that explicitly considers the diverging interests of multiple agents 
and varying contextual factors. 
Multi-agent Collaboration 
A second and equally important implication of our research is about how , 
hotel owners and operators decide on increasing resource efficiency. We 
focus on the dyadic relationship surrounding an asset: the hotel property ' 
owner and hotel operator. Nearly one third of the built environment in our ; 
hospitality industry dataset is owned by real estate investors (individuals ? 
and groups—e.g., corporations, LLCs). Generally, they maximize a com- "\ 
bination of their rents and their assets' long-term value. Organizationally, • 
these owners may be absentee landlords with little time or inclination to un-
derstand and manage the day-to-day operations and the challenges. These 
properties typically are managed by large hotel chains that are experts in 
service operations. These operators understand and track the operating J 
cost factor, as well as the guest behavior that drives resource consumption. | 
It is clear that these two parties need to work collaboratively toward J 
increasing resource efficiency. For instance, the installation of solar panels .: 
to heat water requires approval and funding from the property owner. | 
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Yet merely adding solar panels usually is not enough to realize cost sav-
ings, because the peak generation of energy mid-day does not coincide 
with the peak demand for hot water, typically in the morning. The hotel 
operator may decide to change the housekeeping and laundry schedule to 
take advantage of the abundant hot water during the middle of the day. 
This is easier to achieve when the asset ownership and operating tasks are 
governed by a single entity such as in vertically integrated hotels. 
Incentive Design 
The ownership of a hospitality physical asset increasingly is separated 
from its operator, and the economic and social interests of the asset owner 
and the operator are rarely aligned. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-
known metaphor used in psychological, sociological, and economic re-
search to model situations of social conflict between two or more inter-
dependent actors (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Janssen 2008; Pruitt 1967). The 
essence of the dilemma is that each individual actor has an incentive to act 
according to competitive, narrow self-interests even though, in general, all 
actors receive greater payoffs if they collectively cooperate. We follow the 
structure outlined by Cable and Shane (1997) to explain the underlying 
tensions in the Prisoner's Dilemma in figure 5.4. 
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PAYOFFS: Temptation > Reward > Punishment > Sucker 
Figure 5.4 
General 2 x 2 payoff matrix for the classical two-person Prisoner's 
(Cable and Shane 1997) 
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Cable and Shane (1997) point out that "consistent with past research 
(e.g., Axelrod and Dion 1988), the payoffs for each actor are dictated by 
the strategy adopted by the other actor and follow the payoff structure 
T > R > P > S, in which T represents the temptation of extra payoff from 
defection, R represents the reward for mutual cooperation, P signifies the 
penalty for mutual defection, and S represents the 'sucker's' payoff (the 
penalty for cooperating while the other actor furtively defects, unknown 
to the sucker). This payoff structure illustrates the Dilemma's conceptual 
value by highlighting the conflict between individual and collective ratio-
nality." In the built environment, such dilemmas have been examined for 
problems such as demand-and-supply mismatch driven by cyclical mar-
kets (Kummerow 1999). Prisoner's dilemmas have also been identified in 
the diffusion of environmental practices in settings such as coastal zone 
and watershed management (Reddy 2000; O'Riordan 1993,3-36). In fig-
ure 5.5, we outline the key factors that drive the commitment of the a'sset 
owner and operator based on the hospitality site database. 
We follow Cable and Shane (1997) in identifying these factors: 
• Site-specific alignment and information sharing: Site-specific varia-
tion is evident in table 5.2 based on differences in ownership structure, 
operating alignment between actors drives the nature and extent of their 
information exchange. 
• Time horizon: The various actors have different planning horizon 
needs. A real estate investor's time horizon is typically longer than that of 
a corporate group trying to make operational improvements. The inves-
tor's time horizon is driven by tax laws, and the nature of investors in real 
estate investment trusts (REITs)—typically three to thirty years. A corpo-
rate group tends to set planning horizons based on organizational needs 
that generally range between three and thirty months. In the hospitality 
industry, the prevailing contract types are revenue-based franchising con-
tracts and profit-based management contracts, whose inherent short-term 
performance bias discourages sustainability investments in the delayed-
payoff and high-upfront-cost scenarios. Assigning the sustainability in-
vestment ownership to the contractual party that has most to gain is one 
way to address the split incentive (Mathewson and Winter 1985). For 
example, new contracting mechanisms can be designed to tie the cost and 
payoff of environmental sustainability investments with the life of the in-
vestment instead of the contractual relationship. Government guarantees 
or third-party investors willing to take the risks (and share the profits) 
from uncertainty may be the broker or even hold the ownership to the 
investment—an arrangement analogous to home mortgages. 
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CA: Asset owner cooperates C0: Operator cooperates 
DA: Asset owner defects D0: Operator defects 
Figure 5.5 
A framework comparing asset owner and operator commitment in the hotel sector 
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• Economic payoffs: The nature of economic payoff depends on the 
resource-savings technologies and the business processes affected by the 
owner's and operator's commitment to increasing resource efficiency. Of-
ten the payoff requires upfront investment along with ongoing operating 
commitments such as investment in terms of staff and working capital. 
Certain technologies, such as insulation, geothermal, and solar units may 
be eligible for government tax credits based on their sustainability im-
pact. Other technologies such as an environmental management system 
may also contribute to sustainability, but are often ineligible for the tax 
credits. Life-cycle analysis (LCA) of these technologies evaluates the cost 
and payoff comprehensively and therefore should be the basis of policy 
or tax incentives. 
• Transactional burdens: The behavior of individual actors is affected 
not only by contractual arrangements that bind the actors, but also by 
the size and schedule of payoff as well as penalties for noncompliance 
with the contractual arrangements. It is important to realize that parties 
outside the contractual relationship, such as the hotel guests, may actively 
affect the payoff of the sustainability investment through their influence 
on the consumer behavior cost factor (Zhang, Joglekar, and Verma 2011). 
We recognize that our framework holds many limitations. It considers 
only two key players—owner and operator—out of the many stakehold-
ers in the hotel service supply chain. There is significant difficulty in mea-
suring in practice the key constructs depicted in figure 5.5. We assume a 
single-shot game set-up, yet the agents often need to make repeated deci-
sions, such that their brand image influences the observers' assessments. 
Fleshing out such a framework should offer useful solutions for built en-
vironment settings where sustainability practices are difficult to instill. 
Policy Implications for the Built Environment 
We posit that instituting public policy and program changes may prompt 
the hotel property owner and operator to commit to sustainability prac-
tices and stimulate the diffusion of environmental sustainability practices 
in this industry. First, to facilitate information exchange and compari-
son, it may be more effective for government agencies such as the EPA 
to recognize the contingent nature of performance across sites in future 
standards and programs. For example, the EPA's Portfolio Manager in its 
current version, which ranks all U.S. hotels in the same group, misses the 
opportunity to identify local sustainability champions and to help spread 
green practices. The EPA could better achieve its goals by customizing its 
Why Multinational Corporations Still Need to Keep It Local 121 
approach and creating programs that serve specific types of hotel sites 
based on ownership, operating structure, guest type, location, and ambi-
ent weather conditions. Moreover, two kinds of monitoring mechanisms 
are needed. One would ensure that the contractual parties fulfill their 
commitments. A system similar to the financial accounting reporting sys-
tem would likely work for environmental reporting. The other monitor-
ing mechanism would ensure that the full potential of the design and 
. construction standards is actually realized in operation. This monitor-
ing system will rely on the "smart" technologies emphasizing sensing and 
real-time energy management being deployed in the built environment. 
Movement in this positive direction is also reflected in the changes pro-
posed in the 2012 LEED standards, which include resource metering and 
data sharing. 
* Conclusion 
As the world we live in becomes flatter and hotter, it is increasingly im-
portant to identify sustainability solutions sensitive to local variations 
and for policies to support those solutions. In this chapter, we offer pre-
! liminary evidence on how these local variations may affect sustainability 
; performance in a typical built environment—the hospitality industry— 
r and present the policy implications of these local variations. 
* By focusing on two primary drivers of resource consumption—opera-
[ tional choices and customer behavior—we obtain an industry-wide mea-
; sure of sustainability performance. On the operational side, information 
for evaluating and selecting sustainability initiatives is lacking due to the 
p paucity of metrics for resource consumption and efficiency. However, the 
advent of the "smart hotel" that utilizes sensor and automation technolo-
gies to acquire real-time information promises more detailed and sensi-
i tive metrics to be constructed using an approach similar to ours. On the 
; consumer behavior side, the sociological development in green market-
l ing (Prakash 2002) and consumer receptivity to sustainable products and 
services (Shrum, McCarty, and Lowrey 1995) are key issues. Consumer 
behavior research experiments coupled with discrete choice analysis (Mc-
Fadden 1974; Verma, Thompson, and Louviere 1999) can be designed to 
study the factors influencing customer choice. 
We show that systematic differences in sustainability performance ex-
ist across basic hotel characteristics ranging from ownership structure 
to local weather conditions. These differences informed our framework 
for understanding the manner in which multiple agents can cooperate 
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and commit to sustainability practices. Future research can address the 
complexity involved in this framework in two complementary directions: 
game theoretical analysis followed by empirical validation highlights this 
framework's salient effects and relationships, which are briefly explored 
in the "incentive design" section of this chapter; simulation using system 
dynamics (Forrester 1971) tools is another fruitful research direction. 
A multi-agent approach (for example, Swaminathan, Smith, and Sadeh 
1998) could be especially useful in elucidating the relationships among 
supply chain partners, and significantly enrich contexts where key effects 
unfold. 
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